How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions

By Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, 2005

1,648 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9ed6d2833ae315921f754e40802916340b148701

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Citations in the corpus

Generalized Compact Knapsacks Are Collision Resistant (2006, background): “With current hash functions that are not based on any hardness assumptions, but used in practice, being broken [23, 24, 4], we believe that it may be an appropriate time to consider using efficient hash functions which do have an underlying hardness assumption, especially worst-case ones.”
Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (2011, methodology): “In contrast, the area of hash function cryptanalysis is growing quickly, encouraged by the cryptanalysis of MD5 [48], of SHA-0 [6, 14] and SHA-1 [47], followed by a practical attack on protocols using MD5 [44, 45], preimage attacks on Tiger [28] and MD5 [43], etc.”
The Skein Hash Function Family (2009, background): “The most commonly used hash functions are those of the SHA family: SHA-0 [80], SHA-1 [81], SHA-256, and SHA-512 [83], all based on MD4 [93] and MD5 [94].”
VUDDY: A Scalable Approach for Vulnerable Code Clone Discovery (2017, background): “Although we are aware that the MD5 hash algorithm suffers from cryptographic weaknesses [43], two facts make MD5 sufficient: Our use of MD5 is not for cryptography; and VUDDY is designed such that hash collision occurs only when two different functions have identical lengths.”
SWIFFT: A Modest Proposal for FFT Hashing (2008, background): “Recently, new cryptanalytic techniques [29,30,4] have started casting serious doubts both on the security of these specific functions and on the effectiveness of the underlying design paradigm.”
Secure Hybrid Encryption from Weakened Key Encapsulation (2007, methodology): “So as long as one does not want to sacrifice provable security by implementing the TCR function with a dedicated hash function like SHA-x or MD5 (what potentially renders the whole scheme insecure given the recent progress in attacking certain hash functions [38, 39]), one must either resort to inef”
The First Collision for Full SHA-1 (2017, background): “from the mid-2000s [43, 44, 42], but have widely varying complexities.”
Efficient Collision-Resistant Hashing from Worst-Case Assumptions on Cyclic Lattices (2006, background): “of many popular hash functions casts doubt on the heuristic approach [26, 25].”
Efficient Collision Search Attacks on SHA-0 (2005, methodology): “For MD5, the conditions are very concentrated in steps 17 and 18, while for SHA-0 the conditions are spread out due to the local collisions.”
Guessing human-chosen secrets (2012, background): “(4)Both MD5 and SHA-1 are vulnerable to collision-finding attacks [304] though the one-wayness of neither algorithm has been compromised.”
Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1 (2005, methodology): “In particular, our analysis is built upon the original differential attack on SHA-0 [14], the near collision attack on SHA-0 [1], the multi-block collision techniques [12], as well as the message modification techniques used in the collision search attacks on HAVAL-128, MD4, RIPEMD and MD5 [11,13,12”
The Algorithm Design Manual (2020, background): “Serious problems with the security of MD5 have recently been exposed [WY05].”
The PHOTON Family of Lightweight Hash Functions (2011, background): “While not as mature as block-ciphers, the research on hash functions saw a rapid development lately, mainly due to the groundbreaking attacks on standardized primitives [37, 35, 36].”