Motivations for Changes in Disclosure Frequency and Its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment Disclosures
By Christine A. Botosan, M. Stanford. 2000
333 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c90da75f21d6de8c234e01956682e0a7da3870d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Philip G. Berger
- Daniel A. Bens
- S. Monahan
- Rebecca N. Hann
- Eti Einhorn
- Audra L. Boone
- Andrea Prat
- Ioannis V. Floros
In Finance
- Philip G. Berger
- Daniel A. Bens
- Eti Einhorn
- S. Monahan
- Audra L. Boone
- Andrea Prat
- Ioannis V. Floros
- Shane A. Johnson
In Strategy and Management
- Daniel A. Bens
- Philip G. Berger
- S. Monahan
- Rebecca N. Hann
- Eti Einhorn
- Audra L. Boone
- Andrea Prat
- Ioannis V. Floros
Citations in the corpus
- Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure (2007, background): “Botosan and Harris (2000) examine the determinants of managers' decisions to voluntarily increase segment disclosure frequency and do not find any association with proprietary costs.”
- Redacting Proprietary Information at the Initial Public Offering (2015, background): “Prior work has produced mixed evidence on whether greater competition increases or decreases firms’ propensity to voluntarily disclose information (Harris 1998; Botosan and Harris 2000; Botosan and Stanford 2005; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Verrecchia and Weber 2006).”