Algebraic Attacks on Stream Ciphers with Linear Feedback

By Nicolas T. Courtois, Willi Meier. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, 2003

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Algebraic Attacks and Decomposition of Boolean Functions (2004, background): “1 [8, 9] Let f be any Boolean function with n inputs.”
A Stream Cipher Proposal: Grain-128 (2006, background): “Thus, the expected complexity of a time-memory-data trade-off attack is not lower thanO(2128).”
Boolean Models and Methods in Mathematics, Computer Science, and Engineering: Boolean Functions for Cryptography and Error-Correcting Codes (2010, positive): “As shown in [117], the algebraic immunity of any n-variable function is bounded above29 by dn/2e.”
Cube Attacks on Tweakable Black Box Polynomials (2009, methodology): “This stream cipher can thus be broken in less than 2(30) bit operations, even though it could not be attacked by any previous technique, including correlation attacks or the analysis of low Hamming weight LFSR modifications (see for instance [13],[14],[15],[16],[17], and [18]).”
Extending SAT Solvers to Cryptographic Problems (2009, methodology): “Extending SAT Solvers to Cryptographic Problems 247 and stream ciphers with linear feedback [14].”