Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government

By T. Besley. 2006

1,208 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c428b32aacc43a3192178dbd189460bb12c527c

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Citations in the corpus

Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies (2011, background): “Furthermore, a politician’s ethnic identity is often a good predictor of redistributive preferences (Pande, 2004; Besley et al., 2007). All else being equal, both reasons will cause voters to favor politicians belonging to their own ethnicity and this will provide the party that represents the major”
Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (2012, background): “By reducing electoral competition, it reduces the incentives for politicians to forgo their personal interest (Besley 2006).”
Monitoring Corruptible Politicians (2016, background): “Our empirical results also have intriguing implications for the theory of political agency (see Besley 2006 and Ashworth 2012 for reviews of the theoretical literature and its connection with recent empirical work).”
Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy (2009, unknown): “Political Rentsi = + 1Political competitioni + 2V oter informationi (7) + Controlsi + i;”
California Dreamin’: The Feeble Case for Cluster Policies (2011, background): “Turning to the second question, there is a very large political economy literature that shows how and why governments cannot be expected to be fully benevolent (see the recent synthesis of Besley, 2006).”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “A good example is the study by Besley and Burgess (2002). Based on panel data for Indian states from 1958 to 1992, they examine how responsive state governments in India are to several shocks.”
Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana (2011, methodology): “For an overview and introduction to theories, see Besley (2006), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000).”
Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit (2014, background): “In sum, our evidence shows that newspapers improve real accountability (Besley, 2007).”
Press Coverage and Political Accountability (2010, unknown): “This was the belief of the framers of the Constitution and is a standard feature of monitoring models of political agency (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000; Besley 2006).”