Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets : An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
By Partha Dasgupta, Peter J. Hammond. 2007
2,576 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9ba558e613372642d3c24357e21f76835859e709
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Citations in the corpus
- Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, methodology): “Some models that endogenize the contract offers generate Pareto improving mandates (e.g., Wilson, 1977) or Pareto improving tax-transfer schemes (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).”
- Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture (2011, unknown): “We model competition between firms using the notion of a competitive equilibrium under adverse selection of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However, we extend their equilibrium concept to account for workers’ optimal behavior in firms by requiring workers to play a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.”
- Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View on the Costs and Benefits of Labor Market Flexibility (2010, unknown): “For further discussion of the issues, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).”
- Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies (2008, background): “An important insight of the microeconomic insurance literature (see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) is that competitive insurers have an incentive to break away from pooling contracts.”
- Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “On one hand is the view that high executive rewards reect a high demand for rare skills (Rosen 1981) and the e¢ cient workings of a competitive market allocating talent to where it is most productive, for instance to manage larger rms (Gabaix and Landier 2008).”
- WHY IS THE TAKE‐UP OF MICROINSURANCE SO LOW? EVIDENCE FROM A HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN INDIA (2010, background): “Standard models of adverse selection (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) expect that riskier individuals are more likely to purchase the insurance given an equal premium and benefits.”