An Uninstantiable Random-Oracle-Model Scheme for a Hybrid-Encryption Problem
By Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, Adriana Palacio. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, 2004
298 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b78b82a838879aa44085703244fa60f8bf448a9
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Jens Groth
- Katriel Cohn-Gordon
- Douglas Stebila
- Yevgeniy Dodis
- Jean-Sébastien Coron
- Renato Renner
- Clemens Holenstein
- Ueli M. Maurer
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Douglas Stebila
- Yevgeniy Dodis
- Jean-Sébastien Coron
- Renato Renner
- Clemens Holenstein
- Ueli M. Maurer
- Jens Groth
- Marco Tomamichel
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Katriel Cohn-Gordon
- Douglas Stebila
- Yevgeniy Dodis
- Jean-Sébastien Coron
- Renato Renner
- Clemens Holenstein
- Ueli M. Maurer
- Benjamin Dowling
Citations in the corpus
- Short Pairing-Based Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments (2010, background): “Unfortunately, there are several examples of protocols that are secure in the random oracle model, but do not have any secure standard model instantiation no matter which hash-function is used [9,10,34,3,37].”
- Indifferentiability, Impossibility Results on Reductions, and Applications to the Random Oracle Methodology (2004, result): “Other similar impossibility results are proposed in [12] and [1].”
- A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol (2017, background): “There are even pathological constructions which are provably secure with random oracles, but which can never be secure when the random oracle is replaced with any concrete primitive [5,19].”
- Merkle-Damgård Revisited: How to Construct a Hash Function (2005, background): “In fact, many recent “separation” results [11, 26, 19, 2, 12, 15] illustrated various cryptographic systems secure in the random oracle model but completely insecure for any concrete instantiation of the random oracle (even by a family of hash functions).”
- Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures (2006, background): “It is well known that using the random oracle model sometimes results in insecure real life protocols [18,19,34,27,4].”