The evidence for motivated reasoning in climate change preference formation
By James N. Druckman, Mary C. McGrath. Nature Climate Change, 2019
572 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9ae1c04832e6e86e06e9552516f12154801b80f7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- David G. Rand
- Dietram A. Scheufele
- Gordon Pennycook
- Dominique Brossard
- J. Reser
- Nicole M. Krause
- Graham Bradley
In Sociology and Political Science
- David G. Rand
- Gordon Pennycook
- Joshua A. Tucker
- Dominique Brossard
- Dietram A. Scheufele
- J. Reser
- Nicole M. Krause
- Isabelle Freiling
Citations in the corpus
- Moderating with the Mob: Evaluating the Efficacy of Real-Time Crowdsourced Fact-Checking (2021, background): “There is robust evidence of partisan-motivated reasoning as individuals seek out information that confirms their partisan identity (Van Bavel and Pereira 2018; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Druckman and McGrath 2019).”
- The Psychology of Fake News. (2021, background): “Thus, observing a difference across ideological lines is not sufficient evidence to conclude that partisan identity or political motivations are themselves responsible for the difference [27,125].”
- Believing and sharing misinformation, fact-checks, and accurate information on social media: The role of anxiety during COVID-19 (2021, background): “However, another explanation for these same outcomes is that individuals simply possess different beliefs about which sources are accurate (Druckman and McGrath, 2019), since source credibility and trustworthiness are known to influence beliefs (Metzger et al.”
- The nature, significance, and influence of perceived personal experience of climate change (2020, background): “…and conceptualized as instances of motivated reasoning/confirmation bias and/or prone to other ‘subjective’ limitations and heuristic biases (e.g., Demski et al., 2017; Druckman & McGrath, 2019; Kunda, 1990; Lujala & Lein, 2020; Myers et al., 2013; Reser et al., 2014; van der Linden, 2014).”