Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion

By Joel B. Slemrod. 2007

1,206 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9ac53fa89e4e178276def7f14723487f9167d310

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Gender Studies

Citations in the corpus

Tax Bunching, Income Shifting and Self-employment (2013, background): “It is well-known, however, that tax avoidance and tax evasion among tax-ﬁlers are not only empirically relevant, they also bias estimates of behavioral response to tax changes, cf. Slemrod (1994, 2007).”
Taxation and the worlds of welfare (2009, background): “Slemrod, 1985), conclusive estimates of tax evasion remain elusive, and cross-cultural comparisons are particularly limited (see the reviews in Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod, 2007).”
The Effects of Regulatory Scrutiny on Tax Avoidance: An Examination of SEC Comment Letters (2016, background): “Also, the prior literature suggests that a firm’s tax positions can be an opening bid in a strategic game of IRS audit adjustments (Slemrod 2007; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001; Hoopes et al. 2012).”
Religious Social Norms and Corporate Financial Reporting (2012, neutral): “Second, many view aggressiveness in tax planning for sheltering purposes as cheating the spirit of the tax law (Slemrod, 2007).”
Measuring the shadow economy using company managers (2015, neutral): “(1998) and Slemrod (2007) for a review).”
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2016, neutral): “Tax evasion generates significant losses and distortions in government revenues.1 The literature (e.g., Slemrod (2007); Besley and Persson (2013)) describes three main determinants of tax compliance: enforcement technology, political incentives, and cultural norms.”
Are the Neighbors Cheating? Evidence from a Social Norm Experiment on Property Taxes in Peru Job Market Paper (2014, background): “However, we also observe that people comply much more with some taxes than with others, in a way that closely reflects the probability of evasion being detected (Slemrod 2007, Kleven et. al 2011).”
Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness (2009, background): “1 For an overview see: Cowell (1990), Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Slemrod (2007). than the objective probabilities of detection.2 Further advances in this strand of literature are based on an alternative approach to the expected utility theory (e.g. cumulative…”
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE? (2018, neutral): “…some 7 See: Cowell (1990), Pyle (1991), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), Richardson and Sawyer (2001), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Kirchler (2007), Slemrod (2007), Torgler (2007), Alm (2012), Sandmo (2012), Slemrod and Weber (2012), and Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam (2013).”