Alliances: Why Write Them Down?

By J. Morrow. 2000

249 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization (2003, background): “Alliances also seek to alter inter-state behavior by manipulating beliefs (Fearon, 1997; Morrow, 2000).”
Reputation and Status as Motives for War (2014, background): “…of reputations can help a state win a contest of expectations by favorably altering the expected costs of conflict, such as a reputation for being a reliable ally (Morrow 2000, p. 71; Miller 2012), for military capability, for cost tolerance (Cochran 2012), and for coveting the issue in dispute.”
Toward a Network Theory of Alliance Formation (2012, unknown): “Some costs, such as a loss of autonomy and limitation of available actions ( Altfeld 1984 ; Morrow 1987 , 1991 , 2000 ), are realized regardless of whether the alliance is ever activated, but the most substantial costs are prospective costs at the time the alliance is formed.”