Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols
By Ran Canetti. Journal of Cryptology, 2000
1,504 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9a639a1e48318a482fb646e5e9f9ab8d006f69c2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dan Boneh
- Yehuda Lindell
- David E. Evans
- Marcel Keller
- Jonathan Katz
- Benny Pinkas
- Thomas Schneider
- Yuval Ishai
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Dan Boneh
- Yehuda Lindell
- Benny Pinkas
- Ran Canetti
- Yuval Ishai
- Elaine Shi
- Jesper Buus Nielsen
- Amit Sahai
Citations in the corpus
- Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation (2001, neutral): “The actual definition [14,1,5] blends these two conditions (see Section 2).”
- Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation (2002, background): “[40, 9].”
- A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation (2009, background): “The definition of security that has become standard today [1] [4] [10] [11] blends these two conditions.”
- Extending Oblivious Transfers Efficiently (2003, background): “from [7], guarantee that the call to g can be replaced by any secure2 protocol realizing g, without violating the security of the high level protocol.”
- The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications (2015, neutral): “We will describe and analyze our protocols in a multiparty setting that employs elements from previous formulations of secure multiparty computation ( MPC ) (specifically, Canetti’s formulation of “real world” execution as in [17] and [18–20]).”
- Secure Multiparty Computation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (2009, methodology): “This is necessary for probabilistic functionalities; see (8; 21) for a full discussion.”
- Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer - Efficiently (2008, methodology): “We use the Universal Composition (UC) framework [9], although our protocols can also be instantiated in the stand-alone setting using the composability framework of [8, 21].”
- Quid-Pro-Quo-tocols: Strengthening Semi-honest Protocols with Dual Execution (2012, neutral): “It follows from standard composition theorems [4] that the DualEx protocol securely computes f with one-bit leakage if the trusted entities are replaced by secure protocols (achieving the standard security definition against malicious adversaries).”
- Secure Two-Party Computation is Practical (2009, methodology): “We will focus on the construction of Lindell and Pinkas [23] which is efficient and provides fully simulatable security according to the definition of Canetti [8] 4 .”
- Privacy Preserving Data Mining (2000, neutral): “The composition theorem (for sequential composition) is also true for the malicious case, but is far more complex (see [4]).”
- High-Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation with an Honest Majority (2016, methodology): “We use the definition of security in the presence of semihonest adversaries as in [6, 11], making the necessary changes to formalize perfect security as well.”
- Data-oblivious graph algorithms for secure computation and outsourcing (2013, methodology): “sition of secure building blocks leads to the security of the overall solution using the composition theorem from [12].”
- Differentially private data aggregation with optimal utility (2014, background): “Finally, the support for a variety of perturbation mechanisms enables the execution of different kinds of analytical queries.”
- Secure Two-Party Computation via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer (2011, background): “© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011 parties send their inputs to an incorruptible trusted party who computes the output for the parties.”
- Strathprints Institutional Repository (neutral): “By the composition theorem [13], if ρ securely computes F , then the joint output distribution of a protocol π in a hybrid execution with F is computationally indistinguishable from the joint output distribution of the real protocol π ρ .”