Leakproofing the Singularity Artificial Intelligence Confinement Problem
By Roman V Yampolskiy. 2012
83 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Safety, Robustness & Interpretability
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Safety, Robustness & Interpretability
- Tom Everitt
- Shane Legg
- Miljan Martic
- Stuart Armstrong
- Jan Leike
- David Krueger
- Vishal Maini
- Stuart J. Russell
Citations in the corpus
- Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research direction (2018, background): “• Containment breach (Yampolskiy, 2012; Babcock et al., 2016): the agent might have an incentive to disable or circumvent any containment measures that are intended to limit its operational scope.”
- Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence (2015, background): “systems that could have undesirable behaviors and consequences in less controlled environments (Yampolskiy 2012).”
- Utility function security in artificially intelligent agents (2014, background): “However, it is important not to confuse the self-administered Delusion Box with the idea of AI-Boxing, a placement of a potentially unsafe artificial intelligence in a confined environment with no way to escape into the ‘real’ world (Yampolskiy, 2012).”
- Motivated Value Selection for Artificial Agents (2015, background): “25It could be set to zero, but this might interfere with the AI’s computation of counterfactuals.”
- Good and safe uses of AI Oracles (2017, background): “An Oracle is a common high-level idea for ensuring the safe use of powerful Ar-tificial Intelligences (AIs) [Armstrong et al., 2012, Yampolskiy, 2012, Bostrom, 2014].”