Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption

By Jana Kunicová, S. Rose-Ackerman. British Journal of Political Science, 2005

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Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure (2014, background): “See for example, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005), Tavits (2007), and Nyblade and Reed (2008).”
What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? (2007, background): “Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman (2005) confirm this and find that presidentialism is particularly harmful when combined with closed-list proportional representation (PR) in legislative elections.”
Regulation and corruption (2015, unknown): “Similarly, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that closed list parliamentary systems have less corruption and mixed systems with proportional representation attributes also exhibit less corruption than presidential systems.”
Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison (2011, unknown): “According to Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005), participation, political competition, and constraints on the chief executive all increase the ability of the population to monitor and legally constrain politicians from engaging in corrupt behavior.”