Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

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Dynamic Stability of the Replicator Equation with Continuous Strategy Space (2004, background): “For instance, the candidate stable equilibrium P* for the standard War of Attrition Game (Oechssler and Riedel, 2001; Cressman, 2003) with continuous strategy space as compact interval has the entire first half of this interval contained in its support.”
Evolutionary Dynamics of Multi-Agent Learning: A Survey (2015, background): “We can now write the continuum limit of the standard replicator dynamics (Equation 5) as a partial differential equation (Oechssler & Riedel, 2001; Cressman, 2005; Tuyls & Westra, 2009): ∂φ(x, t) ∂t = φ(x, t) V (x, t) − E(t) (17) 7.”
The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences (2007, background): “A special case of the class of growth rate functions that we consider is the familiar replicator dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) for distributions with a finite support, and by Oechssler and Riedel (2001) for general distributions.”