Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico

By Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Federico Estévez. 2007

243 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/98a1710c09d0dc01117dc3d7aa35889284318639

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Ruth Kricheli
2. Staffan I. Lindberg
3. Beatriz Magaloni
4. K. Weghorst
5. Michael K. Miller

Citations in the corpus

• What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa (2013, background): “It is unclear whether parties more effectively win voters by targeting persuadable “swing voters” (Magaloni et al. 2007; Schady 2000; Stokes 2000), by rewarding core supporters (Yarahuan 2006), or through some combination of both (Dunning and Stokes 2010).”
• What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana* (2010, result): “In competitive constituencies, MPs report that they use clientelism both to persuade swing voters, and to mobilise people who would, if they vote, support their party, which lends support to earlier findings by scholars such as Magaloni et al. (2007).”
• Political Order and One-Party Rule (2010, background): “…between the existence of legislatures and economic growth can be explained by the higher levels of institutionalization enjoyed by autocrats who choose to have a legislature, not by the legislatures’ existence (Lust-Okar 2005, 2006; Magaloni et al. 2007; Masoud 2008; Shehata 2008; Blaydes 2009).”