Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing
By James Nicolaisen, Valentin Petrov, Leigh Tesfatsion. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 2001
450 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/984ff06fd7733bb60e20823071e09c2df2a5f9df
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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Citations in the corpus
- Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies From the Bottom Up (2002, unknown): “[69] construct an ACE model of a restructured wholesale electricity market in which prices are set by means of a discriminatory-price double auction, that is, an auction in which the sellers (generators) and the buyers (electricity purchasers for end-use customers) both actively make price offers.”
- Trading on local energy markets: A comparison of market designs and bidding strategies (2017, methodology): “The implemented learning algorithm is derived from [12].”
- A blockchain-based smart grid: towards sustainable local energy markets (2017, background): “Combining the information of their net energy surplus and credit balance allows the creation of orders according to the agents’ utility functions [29].”