The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies
By Douglas W. Diamond, Raghuram G. Rajan. 2009
602 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/978d14352e992ae22901ecb0121ba3479fae4705
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Luc Laeven
- R. Rajan
- Douglas W. Diamond
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Zhiguo He
- René M. Stulz
- Andreas Hoffmann
- Mariassunta Giannetti
In Finance
- Luc Laeven
- Iftekhar Hasan
- René M. Stulz
- B. Jeon
- Ji (George) Wu
- R. Rajan
- Mariassunta Giannetti
- Zhiguo He
Citations in the corpus
- Risk in Islamic banking and corporate governance (2018, background): “On the other hand, bank managers may sometimes take excessive risk solely to maximize their performance-linked remuneration instead of maximizing shareholders' wealth (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Laeven, 2013).”
- Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, background): “For more formal discussion about how the structure of compensation in banks created perverse incentives, see Diamond and Rajan (2009).”
- A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis (2009, neutral): “2 For a detailed account of the subprime mortgage crisis, see Gorton (2008a, b) and Diamond and Rajan (2009).”
- Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes (2011, background): “Also, unconditional support could increase the incentive to become illiquid in the first place as in Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Fahri and Tirole (2009).”
- Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards (2010, neutral): “…in banking (due to bail-outs and liquidity assistance), low interest rates may induce banks to soften their lending standards by improving banks’ liquidity (Allen and Gale, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2009a; Acharya and Naqvi, 2010) and net worth (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003).”
- On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan (2009, background): “Not 1 Bebchuck (2008), Blanchard (2008), and Diamond and Rajan (2009) illustrate vividly the debate surrounding the implementation of plans for addressing the credit crisis in the U.S. 2 only both crises originated from the burst of a real estate bubble, but also, in the response to the banking…”
- Dynamic Debt Runs (2010, background): “Shortterm debt is a natural response of outside creditors to a variety of agency problems inside the rm, e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2009).”
- The impact of securitization on the expansion of subprime credit (2013, neutral): “The e ours and do not ors of the Federal : þ1 801 422 0741. adauld), because Diamond and Rajan (2009) suggest that a misallocation of resources to the real estate sector, facilitated by activity in the securitization market, contributed to the recent financial crisis.”
- Loan Supply Shocks and the Business Cycle (2017, positive): “…the banking industry, such as the process of securitisation and the increasing recourse to short-term debt, contributed markedly to the lending boom and housing bubble of the mid-2000s and subsequent credit slowdown and house price fall (Brunnermeier, 2009; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Gorton, 2009).”
- Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy (2012, background): “This possibility is also emphasized in both Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Farhi and Tirole (2012).”
- Corporate governance and performance of financial institutions (2015, background): “Firms with weaker corporate governance quality may not implement adequate incentives and controls that can increase shareholder value (Diamond & Rajan, 2009).”