Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems

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Donor Political Economies and the Pursuit of Aid Effectiveness (2015, background): “For example, see Katzenstein 1978; Gourevitch 1986; Simmons 1994; Milner 1997; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; and Nelson 2014.”
The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy (2012, background): “7 Milner (2006) also uses a principal agent model to explain the choice for multilateralism in foreign aid.”
Open economy politics: A critical review (2009, background): “This is true not only of earlier, more functional theories of international regimes (Keohane 1984), but also of more recent models of institutional design (Goldstein et al. 2001; Koremenos et al. 2003).”
Donors and domestic politics: Political influences on foreign aid effort (2010, unknown): “Milner (2006) suggests that multilateral channels might lock-in” levels of aid, making this channel especially opposed by onservatives.”
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking (2020, background): “Whereas governments in donor countries often use aid to advance their political objectives, multilateral donors are thought to be more insulated from these pressures (Rodrik 1996; Martens et al. 2002; Milner 2006).”