Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention

By Huberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister. 2009

252 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9699ac2576c4a79fba16fb3f1aadbd87c9dc56b1

Citations in the corpus

• Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) provide a generalization of the global-games uniqueness result to settings where the action belongs to an arbitrary, finite set, while maintaining strategic complementarity (appropriately defined in terms of supermodularity). Guimaraes and Morris (2007) consider a”
• Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2012, unknown): “Yet another deferred cost of bailouts is the loss of reputation by the central bank.”
• Has the Fed Been a Failure (2012, unknown): “Although in Diamond and Dybvig‘s (1983) model and later studies based on it, including Ennis and Keister (2009), suspension is suboptimal because it entails some disruption of optimal consumption, this conclusion depends on the unrealistic assumption that people cannot shop using (suspended) bank…”
• Competition and Stability in Banking (2016, unknown): “A central bank with a “tough” reputation can alleviate the time-inconsistency problem, while suspension of convertibility may remove incentives encouraging depositors to run (Diamond and Dybvig 1983), but if the banking authority cannot pre-commit to such a deposit freeze and uses an ex-post efficie”
• Central bank digital currency: Central banking for all? (2020, unknown): “” As argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1986) in a classic paper, external forces –in this case, technological innovations– might shape how we think about the role of government in setting up monetary and financial institutions and make us opt for alternative arrangements.”