Access Pattern disclosure on Searchable Encryption: Ramification, Attack and Mitigation

By Mohammad Saiful Islam, Mehmet Kuzu, Murat Kantarcioglu. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2012

819 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/961487973d4b33f96406fddbfcf1235dc587571f

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Citations in the corpus

Securing Fog Computing for Internet of Things Applications: Challenges and Solutions (2018, background): “Summary and Insights: Although many symmetric searchable encryption schemes [176], [177] can preserve index privacy, trapdoor privacy and access pattern privacy simultaneously, privacy leakage in encrypted data search still exists in fog computing.”
Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Searchable Encryption (2015, methodology): “Due to the discrete nature of the count attack, in contrast to the IKK attack, the recovery rate jumps from zero to a signiﬁcant percentage once there is sufﬁcent co-occurrence information.”
DupLESS: Server-Aided Encryption for Deduplicated Storage (2013, background): “We will not explicitly target resistance to traffic analysis attacks that abuse leakage of access patterns [48] or file lengths [24] [31] [40] [47] [59] [65] [72], though our system will be compatible with potential countermeasures.”
Secure k-nearest neighbor query over encrypted data in outsourced environments (2013, background): “Furthermore, during query processing, the cloud can also derive useful and sensitive information about the actual data items by observing the data access patterns even if the data and query are encrypted [4], [5].”
The Melbourne Shuffle: Improving Oblivious Storage in the Cloud (2014, unknown): “, see [4, 14]).”
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation (2019, background): “Several attacks have shown that data leaked for the sake of e ciency can often be exploited (Islam et al., 2012; Naveed et al., 2015; Cash et al., 2015).”
Generic Attacks on Secure Outsourced Databases (2016, result): “In contrast to previous attacks on speciﬁc systems [30, 36, 11, 38], our goal is to capture the fundamental leakage rather than the weaknesses of a speciﬁc implementation, database, or cryptographic tool.”
All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption (2016, methodology): “Compared to prior work [10, 4], our attacks are both more effective in terms of the fraction of queries recovered and far less demanding in terms of the prior information the server knows.”
Highly-Scalable Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Support for Boolean Queries (2013, background): “We don’t discuss here specific countermeasures for limiting the ability of an attacker to perform such statistical inference – see [15] for an example of potential masking techniques.”
Inference Attacks on Property-Preserving Encrypted Databases (2015, unknown): “Islam et al. [25] described the ﬁrst inference attack against an encrypted search solution.”
Dynamic Searchable Encryption in Very-Large Databases: Data Structures and Implementation (2014, unknown): “When the server has a priori information on the database and queries, various statistical attacks are plausible as illustrated, for instance, in [12].”
Path ORAM: an extremely simple oblivious RAM protocol (2012, background): “For example, Islam et. al. demonstrated that by observing accesses to an encrypted email repository, an adversary can infer as much as 80% of the search queries [21].”
Enabling Personalized Search over Encrypted Outsourced Data with Efficiency Improvement (2016, background): “After that, a lot of schemes [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18] under different applications have been proposed.”