Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise

By Humberto Llavador, Robert J. Oxoby. 2005

261 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: when (1) there exists an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96050712ea4e936a2deeff5b63efa39c43d82843

How researchers see this paper

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In Demography

  1. Peter Sandholt Jensen
  2. Stephan Haggard
  3. Toke S. Aidt
  4. R. Kaufman

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Peter Sandholt Jensen
  2. Toke S. Aidt
  3. Stephan Haggard
  4. R. Fleck
  5. R. Kaufman
  6. Nita Rudra
  7. Rajeev Kumar Goel
  8. Guglielmo Tosato

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Peter Sandholt Jensen
  2. Stephan Haggard
  3. Toke S. Aidt
  4. R. Fleck
  5. R. Kaufman
  6. Guglielmo Tosato
  7. Eugen Dimant
  8. Taner Güney

Citations in the corpus