Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets

By Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sharing and may further reduce welfare. We propose a scheme based on mediated data sharing that improves efficiency. (JEL D62, D83, H23, L51, L86, L88)

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/946520a311b74ddbf11ce03077dfa889771a035f