Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

By Philippe Jehiel. Journal of Economics Theory, 2004

471 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/939014adb8b917f1300dea9d5d89826be512b54d

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Citations in the corpus

Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines (2008, methodology): “Accordingly, the treatment in Kamenica (2006) requires retail cost shocks that reduce the informational content of prices.”
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion (2008, background): “We also thank Michael Gottfried, Tim Ganser, and Georgy Egorov for excellent research assistance.”
Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations (2016, methodology): “…(including Eyster and Rabin (2005), Jehiel and Koessler (2008) and Esponda (2008) - see Spiegler (2011, 5The present model does not address environments with an explicit time dimension, and therefore does not subsume analogy-based expectations in extensive-form games, as defined by Jehiel (2005).”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, unknown): “…integers in [0,100]), and the conditional probability that the movie would be of the hy- 36An alternative to the cursed equilibrium model, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium model (Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008) can also model partial sophistication from an equilibrium viewpoint.”
The Bubble Game : An experimental Study of Speculation (An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "The Rational and Irrational Bubbles : an Experiment") (2013, methodology): “Because of the use of one analogy class, we have Pr(B|P = 100) = p1+p2+p3 3 .(22) The”
Self-confidence and strategic behavior (2017, unknown): “This idea is presented in Myerson (1991) and further developed in formal models by Samuelson (2001) and Jehiel (2005); it is also discussed in Gurdal et al. (2013).”
Learning and Equilibrium (2009, background): “…correspond to player 1 only being able to remember the fraction of time that 2 played A2 and not the correlation of this play with 37 Ettinger & Jehiel (2005) explicitly recognized this issue, saying “From the learning perspective…it is important that a (player 1) does not play herself too…”
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017, unknown): “, 2004), cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Esponda, 2008), and analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005).”
What Comes to Mind (2010, unknown): “This feature is neither shared by existing models of imperfect memory (e.g., Mullainathan 2000, Wilson 2002) nor by models of analogical thinking (Jehiel 2005) or categorization (e.g., Mullainathan 2002, Mullainathan et al. 2008).”