Is Corruption an Efficient Grease

By Pierre-Guillaume Méon, Laurent Weill. 2010

844 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/937a06c9140c3df08319c4814b53c9b84ceae6f3

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional factors, opportunity entrepreneurship and economic growth: Panel data evidence (2016, background): “Klapper et al. (2006) and Méon and Weill (2010) find that the effect of inefficient institutions is higher when countries have a high level of corruption.”
CORRUPTION'S DIRECT EFFECTS ON PER‐CAPITA INCOME GROWTH: A META‐ANALYSIS (2014, positive): “According to Aidt et al. (2008) and Méon and Weill (2010), corruption would have weaker or no effects on growth in countries with poor governance quality overall.”
Does Islamic banking development favor macroeconomic efficiency? Evidence on the Islamic finance-growth nexus (2015, methodology): “In addition, Adkins et al. (2002), Méon et al. (2009) and Méon and Weill (2010b) analyze the impact of different facets of institutions on efficiency.”
Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the Literature on Corruption and Growth (2010, background): “those least likely to be found in a typical study, which is a serious omission in light of the attention this factor receives in attempts to assess the grease versus sand debate in the corruption and growth literature (Méon and Weill, 2010).”
How Does Corruption Affect Public Debt? An Empirical Analysis (2017, positive): “…findings and empirical evidence indicate that the growth effect of corruption depends on the institutional environment (Aidt, 2009; De Rosa, Gooroochurn, & Gorg, 2010; Méon & Weill, 2010, Meon and Sekkat, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).”
Rent seeking and the economics of corruption (2016, background): “Murphy et al. (1991) develop this logic in a model of allocation of talent in which the government serves no particular purpose.”