Local tax system, intergovernmental transfers and China's local fiscal disparities
By Kai-yuen Tsui. 2005
122 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/93190ec0be09a8838a7dc0bc8c6a620fe68a1775
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Citations in the corpus
- Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China (2011, background): “Fiscal reforms adopted in China since 1994 created a situation where county governments have nationally determined mandates to provide basic public services, but lack the requisite tax base to fund them properly.(28) To make up for this deficiency, county governments have marketized service provisio”
- Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “Indeed, Tsui (2005) describes how Chinese provincial leaders operate within a well-de ned career structure inside the political hierarchy.”
- Mandate Versus Championship: Vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services in authoritarian China (2014, background): “Since the establishment of the tax-sharing system in 1994, the financial distribution structure between the central government and the local governments has been stabilized (Tsui 2005).”
- Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China (2017, unknown): “Local governments jockey with each other for larger subsidies during negotiations with the central government, meaning that some localities receive funds in excess of what they need while other, less-favored localities fall far short (Tsui, 2005).”