Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance

By Douglas G. Baird, Robert K. Rasmussen. 2006

209 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The Role of Bank Monitoring in Borrowers’ Discretionary Disclosure: Evidence from Covenant Violations (2014, unknown): “from these firms would not decrease after covenant violations because, unlike banks, outside corporate raiders rely on public information to identify and pursue takeover targets (Baird and Rasmussen, 2006; Manne, 1965).”
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “…literature on covenant violations demonstrates that accounting-based covenants are central to creditors’ obtaining control rights and that lenders play an active role in the governance of borrowers outside of payment default and bankruptcy (Baird and Rasmussen, 2006, and Roberts and Sufi, 2009a).”
Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (2009, background): “The central claim of Baird and Rasmussen (2006) is best summarized in their own words: “When a business enters financial distress, the major decisions—whether the CEO should go, whether the business should search for a suitor, whether the corporation should file for Chapter 11—require the blessings…”