Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

By Daniel Diermeier, Randolph Stevenson. American Political Science Review, 2000

117 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/90982a9376918b905bdb3adf8299c61bcae37014

How researchers see this paper

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Petra Schleiter
2. Edward Morgan-Jones
3. John D. Huber

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Petra Schleiter
2. Edward Morgan-Jones

Citations in the corpus

• Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies (2008, background): “8 See Browne, Frendeis, and Gleiber 1984; Warwick 1992; and Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 2000. and thus the risk of failure for an individual minister will decrease over time.”
• Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets (2009, result): “…to occur equate to rules that enable opportunistic election timing by governments is common, and may account for some of the contradictory conclusions that have characterized the literature on political business cycles (for excellent reviews of the literature, see Drazen 2000; Franzese 2002).”