Humanity & Society: Book Reviews
249 citations recorded by the source corpus.
List of Figures and Tables vii Introduction ix CHAPTER ONE: In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods 1 CHAPTER TWO: The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State by Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal 44 CHAPTER THREE: Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring by Eric Helleiner 89 CHAPTER FOUR: From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations by Kathryn Sikkink 121 CHAPTER FIVE: The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct by David Vogel 151 CHAPTER SIX: Racing to the Top ... at Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping by Samuel Barrows 189 CHAPTER SEVEN: Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO by Judith L. Goldstein and Richard H. Steinberg 211 CHAPTER EIGHT: Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little Supranationalism? By Miles Kahler and David A. Lake 242 List of Contributors 277 Index 279
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Citations in the corpus
- Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (2010, background): “76For a similar conceptualization of regulation as a function of supply and demand, see Mattli and Woods 2009.”
- Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012, background): “As such, some have traced the weakness of the banking regulatory framework prior to the crisis to the active lobbying efforts of banks themselves (see Mattli and Woods, 2009: ix; Walter, 2010: 134, 156).”
- The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda (2011, background): “While some power-centered analysts assume that dominant states are unitary actors pursuing various national interests, others have combined their focus on interstate politics with an opening of the “black box” to investigate the domestic sources of state preferences+ Singer and Walter present the mo”
- Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions (2014, background): “…by the literature as favouring the mobilization of societal actors besides the target actors by producing a ‘demonstration effect’, which reveals the distributional implications of regulatory policies and the opening of new channels of access to the regulatory process (Mattli and Woods, 2009).”