Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana
By Eliana La Ferrara. 2003
258 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Soil Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8f291ce6ea20295084f41bd8a8df0ecb7e7e1dc9
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Safety Research
- A. Milazzo
- Jonas Hjort
- Valérie Lechene
- Richard Black
- A. Castaldo
- G. Jin
- Seth Freedman
- Eliana La Ferrara
In Soil Science
Citations in the corpus
- Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Colonial Benin (2015, background): “The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management.”
- Social Connections and Group Banking (2007, unknown): “Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007 recently, La Ferrara (2003) studies kin groups in Ghana and finds that punishment is exacted not only on those who default, but also on the kin of those who default, and that the threat of such punishment induces compliance in the short run.”
- Family Networks and School Enrolment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment (2007, background): “…on household behavior, such as for consumption [Altonji et al 1992]; inter-generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997, La Ferrara 2003, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006]; childrens’ education choices [Loury 2006]; and non-resident parental investments into children [Weiss and…”
- Efficient Responses to Targeted Cash Transfers (2013, background): “…and risk sharing ðAltonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1992Þ, intergenerational transfers ðCox and Jakubson 1995; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1997; La Ferrara 2003; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006Þ, children’s education choices ðLoury 2006Þ, and nonresident parental investments into children ðWeiss…”
- Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms (2014, background): “The plant uses an essentially random rotation process to assign workers to positions, leading to three types of teams: (a) ethnically homogeneous teams, and teams in which (b) one or (c) both downstream workers belong to a tribe in rivalry with the upstream worker’s tribe.”
- Do Social Networks Solve Information Problems for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.Com (2008, background): “Previous researchers have argued that informal lenders and micro-finance institutions have an information advantage over traditional banks because they utilize borrowers’ social networks to ensure good risks (e.g. La Ferrara 2003, Udry 1994, Hoff and Stiglitz 1990).”
- RETURN MIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN GHANA AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL TRANSFERS (2009, result): “The significance of kinship networks in promoting and maintaining small business activities has been noted by other studies in Ghana (La Ferrara 2003; Mazzucato et al. 2006).”
- Customary Norms, Inheritance, and Human Capital: Evidence from a Reform of the Matrilineal System in Ghana (2014, methodology): “, La Ferrara (2003), La Ferrara (2007), Goetghebuer and Platteau (2010), Mobarak et al. (2009), Quisumbing et al. (2001), Quisumbing and Otsuka (2001), Lambert, Ravallion, and van de Walle (2011)). Using a controlled experiment, Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) analyze the determinants of gender diff”
- Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical investigation (2012, background): “Lin et al. (2011)suggested that social networks in P2P lending act as a new source of soft information.”