Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change
By Karen Pittel, Dirk Rübbelke. 2008
142 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse-gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e69d19bc28cb93e202ec7720423b4f2aca7e668
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In Economics and Econometrics
- S. Carattini
- Xingping Zhang
- Xiao-Mei Cheng
- A. Baranzini
- Rudra Prakash Pradhan
- Kuan-Min Wang
- Sharif Hossain
- Muhammad Shahbaz
Citations in the corpus
- Climate policy co-benefits: a review (2020, background): “Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) is an earlier brief review.”
- Energy consumption, carbon emissions, and economic growth in China (2009, background): “The Kyoto Protocol is severely criticized for lack of inclusion of emission reduction obligations for developing countries, as Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) points out: “Due to the rising importance of developing countries' contribution to climate change, their participation in an international…”
- Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data (2017, background): “According to Pittel and Rübbelke (2008), co-benefits may be sufficiently large to justify cooperation in international negotiations and lead to binding international agreements, of course provided that their existence (and magnitude) is recognized.”