The Nature of the Interaction between Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures
By Eti Einhorn. 2005
188 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e0b8e9c28d8bced98479ef091c6dad6e4a92d89
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In Accounting
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital (2013, unknown): “Providing an answer to the second question can help us tie the average cost of capital with firms’ voluntary disclosures and the level of investment across economies at different stages in their life cycles. Although the evidence is still relatively recent, a number of empirical studies document a n”
- What explains variation in voluntary disclosure? A study of the annual reports of corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2010, background): “Paradoxically, more regulation can stimulate and increase the information that corporations voluntarily disclose ( Einhorn 2005; Holland 2005; Linnala 2005).”
- What drives mandatory and voluntary risk reporting variations across Germany, UK and US? (2015, unknown): “Their results are in line with Einhorn (2005)’s findings that emphasise the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures.”
- Voluntary disclosure of non-financial information and its association with sustainability performance (2017, background): “Voluntary non-financial disclosure The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures has been examined in prior research (Einhorn, 2005), suggesting that voluntary financial disclosure can provide additional information to investors (Cohen et al., 2011).”
- The Association Between Management Earnings Forecast Errors and Accruals (2009, background): “Analytically, Einhorn (2005) demonstrates that various features of mandatory reporting (such as the level of discretion in mandatory reporting and the information quality of mandatory disclosure) affect managers’ propensity to provide voluntary disclosure.”