Oligopolistic Competition in Power Networks: A Conjectured Supply Function Approach

By Christopher J. Day, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Jong-Shi Pang. IEEE Power Engineering Review, 2002

510 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8dcf61908c2fcbbae85190d23e7f5cdc90a2475d

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Citations in the corpus

Oligopolistic equilibrium analysis for electricity markets: a nonlinear complementarity approach (2004, methodology): “Therefore, the SFE model has been widely used in equilibrium analysis of generating power markets, among which the linear supply function (LSF) equilibrium model has attracted many researchers’ attention [2], [ 3 ].”
Forecasting Electricity Prices (2003, background): “…that accurate price forecasts will not generally be obtained (Green and Newbery, 1992; Joskow and Frame, 1998; Green, 1999; Batstone, 2000, Skantze et al., 2000; Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Routledge et al, 2001; Baldick, 2002, Day et al, 2002, Andersen and Xu, 2002; Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002).”
Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games (2009, background): “Originated from [20] and extended in several subsequent papers [9, 31, 36, 37], the model considers several electricity firms competing in spatially separated markets along with an arbitrager, whose goal is to exploit price differentials between regions to maximize profit.”
The Demand Elasticity Impacts on the Strategic Bidding Behavior of the Electricity Producers (2007, result): “Basically, an increase in demand elasticity produces the same effects in the market as an increase in competition, a result that is in accordance with previous literature [22].”
Network-constrained Cournot models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details (2005, unknown): “, 2002), conjectured rival supply functions (Day et al., 2002), and “supergames” in which collusive solutions are bounded by incentive compatibility constraints (Harrington et al.”
Electricity price forecasting: A review of the state-of-the-art with a look into the future (2014, background): “Even if the set of equations has a solution, it is often very hard to find, and the modeler has to resort to heuristics to ‘solve’ the problem (Day et al., 2002; Ventosa et al., 2005).”
Electricity market modeling trends (2005, background): “publications (Garcia-Alcalde et al. 2002; Day et al. 2002 ) suggest considering this approach”
Optimal offering strategies for generation companies operating in electricity spot markets (2004, methodology): “Recently, models including conjectural variations have been proposed that are halfway between Cournot and SFE models [7], [8].”
A Model for Efficient Consumer Pricing Schemes in Electricity Markets (2007, background): “market, in the context of a model that more realistically represents consumers’ responses to changing prices (see [40] and references therein for a review of these models).”
Time-of-Use Pricing in Electricity Markets Under Different Market Structures (2012, background): “In the former case, it usually creates a problem, especially in Cournot models, where the prices can rise infinitely, due to inelastic demand [7].”
A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems (2005, background): “Several models of strategic interaction on networks have been developed (see reviews by Daxhalet and Smeers, 2001; Day et al., 2002; Ventosa et al., 2004).”
Examining market power in the European natural gas market (2006, background): “The second scheme to determine prices posits that each producer conjectures how rival sales at node n will change if the computed price changes from its equilibrium value as a result of firm f shifting its sales (Day et al., 2002; Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2004; Lise et al., 2006).”
Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs with incomplete information (2005, background): “which is a linear function of its generation . The GENCO may prepare its strategic bids according to the following economic models [ 13 ], [14].”