How Ruthless Is Mortgage Default? A Review and Synthesis of the Evidence

By Kerry D. Vandell. 2001

213 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Re-Default (2009, unknown): “While negative equity is a necessary condition for default, a debate among economists concerns its sufficiency (Vandell 1995).”
Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures (2007, background): “9See Vandell (1995) for a survey of the empirical default literature, and a discussion about the importance of individual variables in the default decision.”
An Improved Fixed-Rate Mortgage Valuation Methodology with Interacting Prepayment and Default Options (2008, background): “a financially ruthless default behavior (first employed by Foster and Van Order, 1984, 1985; see also Vandell, 1995, for a review).”
Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence (2008, unknown): “Vandell (1995) reviews the empirical studies that have tested the frictionless, option-theoretic models of default, which predict that borrowers with similar mortgages and homes will exhibit identical default behavior. behavior, then we would expect a strong correlation between these…”
Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values (2009, background): “However, empirical evidence suggests that negative equity itself is far from enough to cause a default (for instance, Vandell 1995; Deng et al. 2005).”