The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.
By Thomas K. Metzinger. 2000
105 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8d3bc3ff63f45365c36b6f7af9555ac94f1aee5a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- T. Buhrmann
- E. D. Di Paolo
- Thomas K. Metzinger
- Hanne De Jaegher
- Tom Froese
- Xabier E. Barandiaran
- Shaun Gallagher
- G. Colombetti
Citations in the corpus
- Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference (2003, background): “content of which may or may not properly depict an external reality, is globally available for attention, cognition and behavioral control (for the notion of “global availability,” see Baars 1988; Chalmers 1997; Metzinger 2000).”
- The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, background): “Even if a meaningful interpretation could be given to the idea of non-conceptual representations, it is clear that whether one believes the comparator approach to be fruitful hinges on one’s acceptance or not of experiences as fundamentally representational in nature (Metzinger 2000; Dretske 2003).”