Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs

By Andrei Sabelfeld, David Sands. Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13, 2000

340 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ca7fe008b626791a44302659c8f899533f6b5bd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. David Sands
2. Andrei Sabelfeld
3. A. Myers
4. Steve Zdancewic
5. Geoffrey Smith

In Hardware and Architecture

1. A. Myers
2. Andrei Sabelfeld
3. David Sands
4. Steve Zdancewic

In Signal Processing

1. David Sands
2. Andrei Sabelfeld
3. A. Myers
4. Steve Zdancewic
5. Geoffrey Smith

Citations in the corpus

• Language-based information-flow security (2003, methodology): “Because scheduling policies may vary from implementation to implementation , Sabelfeld and Sands [11] argue for scheduler-independent security (robust with respect to a wide class of potentially probabilistic schedulers) and prove a noninterference result for a security-type system.”
• Declassification: Dimensions and principles (2009, neutral): “Security is then defined, like for Mantel and Sands [49], as an adaptation of strong low-bisimulation [69].”
• Dimensions and principles of declassification (2005, methodology): “It is argued, with reference to [ SS00 ], that this allows for useful attacker models in which the attacker controls the thread scheduler.”
• Observational determinism for concurrent program security (2003, background): “However, λ SEC does rule out programs that other systems consider secure [17, 38, 19, 36], because those programs allow refinement attacks.”