The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession
By M. Le Breton, Shlomo Weber. Social Science Research Network, 2001
160 citations recorded by the source corpus.
In this paper we examine compensation schemes that prevent a threat of secession by any of a country's regions. We prove that, under quite general assumptions on the distribution of citizens' preferences, there exist transfer schemes that are secession-proof. Moreover, we show that these compensation schemes entail a degree of partial equalization among regions: the gap between advantaged regions and disadvantaged regions has to be reduced but it should never be completely eliminated. We demonstrate that in the case of a uniform distribution of the nation's citizens, the secession-proof conditions generate the 50 percent compensation rule for disadvantaged regions.
Subfields: Demography, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8c354b0e3472d02e777ad236451e592098c54535
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In Demography
In Political Science and International Relations
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Local Public Good Provision, Municipal Consolidation, and National Transfers (2008, unknown): “…being created 10This section is related to the literature on secession and taxation; see, in addition to the papers already mentioned in the introduction, Buchanan and Faith (1987), Le Breton and Weber (2003), Brink (2004), Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), and Haimanko, Le Breton, and Weber (2005).”
- Local public goods and clubs (2002, background): “Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and LeBreton and Weber (2000) explore a hybrid type of model which permits coordinated deviations, but possibly with restrictions on side payments.”