Distracted Shareholders and Corporate Actions

By Elisabeth Kempf, Alberto Manconi, Oliver Spalt. 2016

306 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b553faf7fd687cdc19a8f1da176321b9d7a77a1

Citations in the corpus

• Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure (2020, unknown): “Although we expect that our fixed effects structure mitigates many omitted variable-related concerns, we also include other control variables that prior literature has associated with either institutional ownership or short-term changes in disclosure (e.g., Goodman et al. 2013; Ali et al. 2014; Kemp”
• Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “Consistent with our expectation, Kempf et al. (2017) find”
• Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018, unknown): “For example, Kim and Singal (1993) find that airline mergers during the less tightly regulated period 1985-1988 (all approved by the Department of Transportation) increased airfares in affected routes by 9.”