Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition : Theory and evidence from OECD countries
By Zohal Hessami. 2014
199 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b2cc4d2e85b0ec7bcb3a79752f1ead96407c1c5
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Sergio Galletta
- Toke S. Aidt
- Rajeev Kumar Goel
- Guglielmo Tosato
- Eugen Dimant
- Benjamin Powell
- Jac C. Heckelman
- Peter Sandholt Jensen
In Sociology and Political Science
- Sergio Galletta
- Toke S. Aidt
- Guglielmo Tosato
- Eugen Dimant
- Taner Güney
- Rajeev Kumar Goel
- Benjamin Powell
- Jac C. Heckelman
Citations in the corpus
- Rent seeking and the economics of corruption (2016, background): “Other studies have shown that corruption increases inequality (Gupta et al. 2002) and distorts fiscal and monetary policy and the composition of government spending (e.g., Mauro 1998; Hessami 2014; Dimakou 2015).”
- Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy (2017, background): “Political corruption negatively affects economic growth and fosters excessive and inefficient public spending (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Arin et al., 2011; Hessami, 2014).”