People thinking about thinking people. The role of the temporo-parietal junction in "theory of mind".

By Rebecca Saxe, Nancy Kanwisher. 2003

2,343 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem (2013, positive): “Among other regions, a brain region posterior to the superior temporal sulcus, in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), shows a robust responses while thinking about an individual’s beliefs and desires (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Young and Saxe, 2009a; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Perner et al., 2006).”
Learning to Play with Intrinsically-Motivated Self-Aware Agents (2018, background): “In this scenario, the self-model component of our architecture will need to be not only aware of the agent itself, but also make predictions about the actions of other agents — perhaps providing a connection to the cognitive science of theory of mind [37].”
Inferring the Why in Images (2014, background): “However, we are inspired by the observation that humans have the remarkable cognitive ability to think about other people’s thinking [2, 30].”
The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment (2008, positive): “One such region, the TPJ—a key node in the distributed TOM network (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Vollm et al., 2006)—might be predicted to serve this function during legal decision-making given recent evidence of its role in attributing mental beliefs…”
The social neuroscience of intergroup relations (2008, neutral): “E-mail: david.amodio@nyu.edu”
The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review (2012, background): “…Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. predictions about others’ thoughts and feelings (e.g., as in theory of mind; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; see Mitchell 2009), or make meaning of exteroceptive sensations (e.g., context-sensitive visual perception; Bar et al. 2006;…”
Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory of mind: a lesion study. (2007, background): “…conflicting reports egarding the role of the PFC region in ToM (Apperly et al., 004; Bird et al., 2004; Rowe et al., 2001; Ruby & Decety, 004; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Stone et al., 1998; Stuss et 3 / Neu a i w p n T t m s o e v a t g a a g l t t t p m w o g r p t t s t h d d t t p o t i ( s r 1 i…”
An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment (2009, methodology): “A whole-brain random effects analysis of the data replicated results of previous studies using the same task (Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003 ), revealing a higher BOLD response during belief, as compared with photo stories, in the RTPJ, LTPJ, dMPFC, mMPFC, vMPFC, PC, right temporal pol”
A Hierarchy of Temporal Receptive Windows in Human Cortex (2008, background): “5 cm anterior to that reported previously to be activated by theory of mind tasks [mean Talairach coordinates: 51, 54, 27 (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003)], leaving open the possibility that these are two neighboring (perhaps related) functional areas.”
The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech (2015, background): “Key words: monologue; dialogue; fMRI; auditory verbal hallucinations; covert speech”
fMRI item analysis in a theory of mind task (2011, methodology): “…pb .001; RpSTS: t(38)=5.19pb .001;RTP: t(38)=3.02p=.005;DMPFC: t(38)= 2.09 p=.043; MMPFC: t(38)=2.39 p=.022) providing converging evidence for the whole brain analyses, and replicating the results of previous subject-wise analyses of BELIEF versus PHOTO stories (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003).”
A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions. (2004, background): “…junction is more active when subjects read stories that involved a character's mental states, than stories about physical transformations (e.g. Fletcher, Happe, Frith, Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak, & Frith, 1995; Gallagher, Happe, Brunswick, Fletcher, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).”