Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries : Revisiting Trade-Offs and Policy Options

By T. Whitehead. 2003

137 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Social safety nets are often seen as short-term palliatives or, worse, wastes of scarce money in developing economies. Critics point to leakages of benefits to non-targeted groups (i.e., the non-poor) or the policies' potential adverse effects on the incentives to work or save. Even supporters of social safety nets often view their benefits solely in terms of equity. These policies are rarely seen as an integral part of a strategy for fostering economic growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, many observers have argued that there are significant trade-offs between spending public money on such programs and long-term poverty reduction. Theory and evidence suggest that there may be scope for policies to alleviate current poverty and uninsured risk, and at the same time, to enhance economic efficiency. There have been a number of successful transfer schemes. However, in drawing implications for future policies, targeted transfers may not dominate other options such as fostering new institutions for credit provision, better enforcement of property rights, and supply-side interventions in schooling and healthcare. Theory and evidence suggest that the trade-offs between traditional safety net goals and efficiency have probably been exaggerated. A new approach to social safety nets would recognize their potential to enhance growth and emphasize careful design and evaluation to ensure that that potential is realized.

Subfields: Accounting, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ad13d88446bd582950af5ca555d354cf9fdf02d

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Citations in the corpus

Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction (2007, background): “The case of India, with its long history of interventions aimed at channelling 10 Significantly, this study is cited as evidence that targeting works (Ravallion 2003).”
Introduction: Cash Transfers: Panacea for Poverty Reduction or Money Down the Drain? (2006, background): “Reviewing a range of evidence from a number of poor countries, Ravallion (2003) has questioned the presumed trade-off between addressing inequality or risk aversion and maintaining aggregate output.”
How Cash Transfers Promote the Case for Basic Income (2008, background): “between redistribution or insurance (on the one hand) and growth (on the other) has come to be questioned (Ravallion, 2003).”
How Can Safety Nets Contribute to Economic Growth? (2013, unknown): “Ravallion (2003) reviews some evidence on aggregate growth being higher when inequality is lower, although the direct role of safety nets is seldom traced in this literature.”
Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (2005, unknown): “Galasso and Ravallion (2003) find that the condition was only partially successful at ensuring that the already employed did not participate—and even less successful at increasing employment.”
Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient : Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality (2006, unknown): “Efficiently meeting the first objective requires the transfers to be accurately targeted to poor households—a difficult task not addressed here (van de Walle 1998; Alderman 2001, 2002; Ravallion 2003).”
Rural Poverty (2009, background): “For a helpful review of targeted transfers and safety nets, see Ravallion (2003).”
Examining Conditional Cash Transfer Programs : A Role for Increased Social Inclusion? (2006, background): “By supporting minimal levels of consumption and providing incentives for long-term investments in human capital, CCTs and other safety nets may have an important role in compensating for the market failures that perpetuate poverty, particularly in highinequality settings (Ravallion, 2003).”