Disclosure Incentives and Effects on Cost of Capital around the World
By Jere R. Francis, Inder K. Khurana, Raynolde Pereira. 2005
766 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8aaf35fd274f1f1cddcd70d575aaace424bce418
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Omrane Guedhami
- Christian Leuz
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Dev R. Mishra
- G. Karolyi
- Inder K. Khurana
- Martin Glaum
In Finance
- Omrane Guedhami
- Christian Leuz
- Dev R. Mishra
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Peter D. Wysocki
- G. Karolyi
- Peter D. Easton
- René M. Stulz
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Incentives to Disclose Carbon Information: Evidence from the CDP Global 500 Report (2012, neutral): “This assertion is supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Frankel et al., 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Francis and Khurana, 2005) that finds firms that access external financing are more likely to make voluntary disclosures.”
- Compliance with IFRS 3- and IAS 36-required disclosures across 17 European countries: company- and country-level determinants (2013, methodology): “Francis et al. (2005) examine the interplay between incentives for voluntary disclosure, dis-”
- The Role of Firm-Specific Incentives and Country Factors in Explaining Voluntary IAS Adoptions: Evidence from Private Firms (2008, background): “This finding that private incentives affect voluntary accounting choices, even in countries with weaker contracting environments, is consistent with Francis et al. (2005), who show that firms around the world disclose more when they rely on external financing.”
- Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, neutral): “First, we use firm size (SIZE) as a proxy for information availability, which is expected to be negatively related to the cost of equity capital (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Francis et al., 2005).”
- Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, neutral): “The fundamental prediction and finding in this literature is that firms making timely and informative disclosures are less likely to withhold bad news relevant to debt providers and, as a result, can obtain better credit terms (e.g. Sengupta, 1998; Francis et al., 2005; Ashbaugh et al., 2006).”
- Why Do Countries Matter so Much for Corporate Governance (2007, methodology): “Francis et al. (2005) use this measure to explain CIFAR disclosure scores and find that the 1991-1993 scores are positively related to the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure.”
- IFRS reporting, firm-specific information flows, and institutional environments: international evidence (2012, neutral): “Recent studies by Durnev and Kim (2005), Francis et al. (2005), Hope et al. (2006), and Burgstahler et al. (2006) provide evidence corroborating the above argument.”
- Institutional Investment Horizon and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity (2012, background): “Second, we extend the body of research that investigates the impact of monitoring (i.e., governance) on information quality and agency costs (e.g., Francis et al., 2005).”