Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions
By D. W. Bromley. 2006
296 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a5a8fcec9851786d4a9b00bcf54c1a66be26120
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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services (2010, background): “Inmanysituations, though,more specific rules are developed like in the case of common property management with specific rights concerning access and withdrawal — e.g., Ostrom (1990, 2005); Bromley (1991, 2006).”
- Empathy-Conditioned Conservation: “Walking in the Shoes of Others” as a Conservation Farmer (2009, background): “As Bromley (2006) clarifies, and these empirical results confirm, conservation policy and program facilitators would ask those on both sides of the table to act with empathysympathy, joining in common cause, evolving a new set of shared, pragmatic, sufficient reasons represented in their new shared…”
- Formalising property relations in the developing world: The wrong prescription for the wrong malady (2009, background): “Ownership is both a social fact and a social idea (Becker, 1977; Bromley, 1991, 2006; Christman, 1994).”
- Wicked Problems and Applied Economics (2008, background): “Defusing these conflicts will require that applied economists abandon any prescriptive certitude and disciplinary hubris they might have and engage in respectful discourse (Bromley 2006; Johnson 2007; Klamer 2007).”
- Estimating population size of a nocturnal burrow-nesting seabird using acoustic monitoring and habitat mapping (2014, unknown): “The approach taken in this study is a combination of institutional economics (Bromley 2006, Hodgson 1998) and legal studies (Posner 2003), with a strong emphasis on pragmatism (Talisse and Aikin 2011, Dickstein 1998).”