The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics
By Lorens A. Imhof. 2005
92 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Fudenberg and Harris' stochastic version of the classical replicator dynamics is considered. The behavior of this diffusion process in the presence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is investigated. Moreover, extinction of dominated strategies and stochastic stability of strict Nash equilibria are studied. The general results are illustrated in connection with a discrete war of attrition. A persistence result for the maximum effort strategy is obtained and an explicit expression for the evolutionarily stable strategy is derived.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a3164522e0d9a0e9c5e51bb7bd269359762c893
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In Management Science and Operations Research
In Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
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Citations in the corpus
- Exclusion and persistence in deterministic and stochastic chemostat models (2005, methodology): “We recall the famous paper by Beddington and May [2] about harvesting populations in a randomly fluctuating environment, and also the stochastic equation for evolutionary games derived by Fudenberg and Harris [13], which was recently investigated by Imhof [22].”