Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis

By A. Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Joseph S. Tracy, Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2011

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/89e7c6e5558b3afff313b0c2b7fbf9d58da953e8

Citations in the corpus

• Stock trend forecasting in turbulent market periods using neuro-fuzzy systems (2015, unknown): “In addition financial crisis may arise from stock market crashes, currency crises (Corsetti et al. 1999), bursting of ‘financial bubbles’ [e.g. real estate market crisis (Haughwout et al. 2011)], and sovereign defaults (Lane 2012).”
• Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program (2016, unknown): “As we will show, this makes the treatment and control groups formed based on owneroccupancy status very comparable in our data (see Haughwout et al. 2011, who show differences between owneroccupied and investor loans when they investigate the sample of largely non-agency securitized mortgages).”
• Credit-Induced Boom and Bust (2017, unknown): “Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), for instance, document that new loans to large borrowers fell by 79% between the second quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2008.”
• Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative (2017, unknown): “We follow Haughwout et al. (2011) and define investors as borrowers who hold 2 or more first mortgages. Real estate investors are particularly interesting as they may be more prone to default than mortgage borrowers who reside in the property that secures the mortgage, as we discuss below. Moreover,”
• Speculative dynamics of prices and volume (2017, unknown): “This evidence is consistent with prior work documenting credit growth among speculators during the boom ( Haughwout et al., 2011; Bhutta, 2015; Mian and Sufi, 2022 ).”
• A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs (2014, unknown): “Haughwout et al. (2011) identify “investors” as those individuals that own more than one property …nanced by a distinct mortgage.”
• Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market: Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries (2015, unknown): “…borrowers; Garmaise (2015), who finds that borrowers overstated their assets and that loans granted to such borrowers had higher default rates; and Haughwout et al. (2011), who employ credit bureau data to identify properties acquired by real estate investors and explain the role of such buyers…”
• Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default (2017, unknown): “…LP traditionally did not update LTV or 17Information about whether the borrower is an investor is generally not considered highly reliable; as Haughwout et al. (2011) document, many investors pretended to be occupying the property underlying the mortgage, presumably in order to obtain more…”
• Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market (2013, unknown): “This result is in line with the literature that finds that loans with non-owneroccupancy status are more likely to default when controlling for other observable risk characteristics (see Mayer et al. 2009 and Haughwout et al. 2011).”