Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?

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Lobbying as a collective enterprise: winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union (2013, background): “In order to successfully fulfil its agenda-setting function, the Commission therefore aims to present proposals that gain the consent of the Council and the EP (e.g., Tallberg 2002: 34).”
Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state (2005, background): “Why and how do member states delegate political authority to the supranational level? The most popular concept in this delegation literature is the principal–agent framework, whereby the member state principals delegate powers to supranational agents (Pollack 1997, 2003; Tallberg 2002).”
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe (2002, background): “The empirical analysis covers national IRAs in four major countries – Britain, France, Germany and Italy (the European Community (EC) presents its own speci c issues – cf. Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2002).”