Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*
By John G. Matsusaka. Journal law and economy, 2000
129 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/87edbb6cda86bd3907960967b6dad27dfdc0f359
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- S. Hug
- Arthur Lupia
- Patricia Funk
- Christina Gathmann
- John G. Matsusaka
- Breno Schmidt
- N. J. Foss
- Peter G. Klein
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Direct Democracy Works (2005, unknown): “Matsusaka (2000) found that initiative states spent more than noninitiative states in the early decades of the twentieth century, which challenges the idea that the initiative inevitably favors conservative policies.”
- The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment (2009, unknown): “5 Matsusaka (2000) finds that during the first half of the 20th century, voters in the U.S. initiative states were frequently fiscally less conservative than their elected representatives.”
- Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000 (2011, background): “2Farnham (1989); Zax (1989); Matsusaka (1995, 2000, 2004); Bails and Tieslau (2000); Besley and Case (2003), for the United States; Pommerehne (1978); Feld and Kirchgässner (2001); Feld and Matsusaka (2003); Feld et al. (2008), among others, for Switzerland.”
- DIRECT DEMOCRACY: New Approaches to Old Questions (2004, background): “Matsusaka (1995, 2000, 2004) and Matsusaka & McCarty (2001) find differences in tax and spending policies in American states and cities.”
- Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss Cantons (2003, unknown): “See Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley (1992) for references.”
- Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums (2004, background): “Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin (1996) and Camobreco (1998), on the other hand, fail to find such effects in their studies; however, Matsusaka (2000b) convincingly argues that their empirical model is flawed.”