The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not

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Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go? (2015, background): “Skaperdas (2001) formalizes this idea, while Bandiera (2003) empirically supports it by showing that the mafia was more likely to be active in towns where land was more divided; Buonanno et al. (2012) document that areas characterized by sulphur availability were also more affected by the mafia.”
Mumbai's Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime and Land Development (2008, unknown): “In some cases, the reduction or elimination of regulations, resulting in ‘so-called selfregulating markets’, can facilitate the rise or transformation of organized criminal activities (Skaperdas, 2001; Stiglitz, 2001: xv).”
War and poverty (2010, unknown): “…actors – rebel groups, militias, paramilitary groups, warlords, gangs, mafia, drug trafficking factions, private security providers and vigilante groups – gain the monopoly over the use of violence in contested areas (Arjona 2009; Gambetta 1996; Skaperdas 2001; Volkov 2002; Weinstein 2007).”