Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning 1 1 All reasonings concerning

By Eugenia Goldvarg, Philip N. Johnson-Laird. 2001

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Developmental and Educational Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/874454a0ae37a42f20fda587ec355855475843be

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Physical Causality of Action Verbs in Grounded Language Understanding (2016, background): “For example, different types of causal relations such as causing, enabling, and preventing (Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird, 2001; Wolff and Song, 2003) have been studied extensively as well as their linguistic expressions (Wolff, 2003; Song and Wolff, 2003; Neeleman et al.”
Intuitive Theories (2020, background): “In the case of double prevention, some studies find that participants treat double preventers as causes (Chang, 2009; Lombrozo, 2010; Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009; Wolff, Barbey, & Hausknecht, 2010) whereas others don't (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Walsh & Sloman, 2011).”
Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. (2010, background): “…6.1 contrasts the current hypothesis of causal–explanatory pluralism with existing accounts of causal ascription in psychology, including the mental model theory (Goldvarg & Johnson-laird, 2001), causal model theory (Sloman et al., 2009) and the force dynamics theory (Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007).”
Causal reasoning with forces (2015, methodology): “However, as shown in Table 8 , the percentage of ¬ CAUSE, 50%, was only slightly higher than that for ¬ ALLOW, 40%, so the results observed here do not differ radically from those observed in Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001).”
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations (2006, background): “But people may construct an economical initial representation that makes explicit just the first possibility: the butter is heated and it melts, and the second possibility remains implicit as an unformed thought (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; JohnsonLaird & Byrne, 1991).”
The psychology of moral reasoning (2008, background): “Previous studies have shown that naive individuals distinguish between the two sorts of agents: enablers and causers (Frosch, Johnson-Laird & Cowley, 2007; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001 ).”
Structure and strength in causal induction. (2005, unknown): “This binary decision is a result of the deterministic nature of the existence of causal relationships – either a relationship exists or it does not – a property of causality that is not captured by considering only the strength of a causal relationship (c.f. Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001).”
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, unknown): “These tacit systems of higher-order relations at various levels of generality modulate how human subjects judge and discover novel relations within those domains by a process akin to analogical inference (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird 2001; Lee & Holyoak 2007; Lien & Cheng 2000; Tenenbaum et al. 2007).”