Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?

By E. Janeba, M. Smart. Social Science Research Network, 2001

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8668049822bac635e161bdfdb9788151c315c002

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Citations in the corpus

Causes, benefits, and risks of business tax incentives (2010, background): “Janeba and Smart (2003) work with a more general model, in which limiting tax incentives is harmful when the global capital stock is fixed (as in Keen, 2002), but may otherwise be beneficial. Gugl and Zodrow (2006) consider the welfare effects of using tax incentives on more mobile capital.”
International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “Johannesen and Zucman (2012) survey these events and use data of the Bank of International Settlements on total deposits, held by residents from one country at banks in 14 tax havens, to measure the impact of TIEAs on deposit holdings.”
Saving Taxes Through Foreign Plant Ownership (2010, unknown): “tax base allowances (see, e.g., Weichenrieder, 1996b; Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; Bucovetsky and Hau∞er, 2006a,b).1”
Firms' Financial Choices and Thin Capitalization Rules under Corporate Tax Competition (2012, background): “Second, our analysis also relates to the theoretical literature that investigates whether the abolition of tax preferences for mobile tax bases raises or reduces tax revenues and welfare in the competing countries (Janeba and Peters, 1999; Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; ”
Intellectual property box regimes: effective tax rates and tax policy considerations (2013, background): “Janeba and Smart (2003) present conditions under which restricting the use of preferential rates may be desirable.”
The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals' Financing and Investment Decisions (2006, unknown): “…for tax-planning might result in adverse consequences for the level of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax countries which may also reinforce tax-competition (e.g., Keen, 2001, and Peralta, Wauthy, and van Yperserle, 2006, see also Janeba and Smart, 2003, and Panteghini, 2006).”
A partial race to the bottom: corporate tax developments in emerging and developing economies (2013, background): “20 See Keen (2002), Janeba and Smart (2003), and Gugl and Zodrow (2006), APPENDIX I. DERIVATION OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES Devereux and Griffith (2003) developed a measure of the effective average tax (EATR), which is defined as the ratio of the present discounted value of taxes over the present…”