Does Mandated Audit Communication Reduce Opportunistic Corrections to Manage Earnings to Forecasts

By R. Libby, William R. Kinney. 2000

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/85dd5edcbed3c0e8ac52f337aaa572e6ad5cedd3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. M. Nelson
2. John A. Elliott
3. R. L. Tarpley
4. Kathryn Kadous
5. Kristy L. Towry
6. L. Koonce
7. Stephen Moehrle
8. Joseph F. Brazel

In Finance

1. R. L. Tarpley
2. John A. Elliott
3. M. Nelson
4. L. Koonce
5. Stephen Moehrle

In Strategy and Management

1. R. L. Tarpley
2. John A. Elliott
3. M. Nelson
4. Kathryn Kadous
5. L. Koonce
6. Stephen Moehrle
7. G. He

Citations in the corpus

• Do Firms Use Restructuring Charge Reversals to Meet Earnings Targets (2002, background): “Libby and Kinney (2000) provide experimental evidence that an earnings overstatement identified by auditors is less likely to be corrected if the correction would cause reported earnings to fall below the consensus analyst forecast.”
• Quantification and Persuasion in Managerial Judgment (2004, background): “That is, the estimates, predictions and assumptions may not be readily verifiable (Libby and Kinney 2000).”