Reputation, Compliance, and International Law
By George W. Downs, Michael A. Jones. The Journal of Legal Studies, 2002
266 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/84945bfcea1eb33ec123049f4a6ae7eb5989bc6c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Political Science and International Relations
- Beth A. Simmons
- A. Guzman
- Paul K. Huth
- J. Mercer
- J. Stein
- Eric Neumayer
- Fabrizio Gilardi
- Davide Romelli
In Sociology and Political Science
In Strategy and Management
- Beth A. Simmons
- A. Guzman
- J. Mercer
- Eric Neumayer
- J. Stein
- Fabrizio Gilardi
- Andrew Kerner
- Yoram Z. Haftel
Citations in the corpus
- Reputation and Status as Motives for War (2014, background): “Downs & Jones (2002), employing a rationalist understanding of reputation, argue that reputational inferences will be broader (a) in domains where there is greater correlation in the unobserved shocks that lead an actor to deviate from their reputation; (b) when an action deviates most from the…”
- Rationality and Psychology in International Politics (2005, background): “…different effect+ Jervis, personal communication+ 69+ For example, Riker 1962, 7+ 70+ See respectively, Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1998; and Fearon 1995+ 71+ See Sartori 2002, 136; and Downs and Jones 2002, 101+ 72+ Jervis 1976+ 73+ Morrow 1994, 55, 219, 242+ a function, at least in part, of an actor’s…”
- Treaty Compliance and Violation (2010, background): “There may also be limits to the ability of reputational considerations to support self-enforcing agreements across unrelated issue areas, where behavior is difficult to observe, and within communities in which future interactions are sparse or not very highly valued (Downs & Jones 2002).”
- International Soft Law (2010, background): “In effect, a state’s reputation for compliance with international law is unlikely to hinge on any one commitment, and so states are free to be risk neutral with respect to individual commitments.”
- Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment (2016, unknown): “While this argument about the constraining effect of global capital is both compelling and plausible, some previous scholars have highlighted the limitations of reputational explanations of international cooperation (Downs and Jones 2002; Mercer 1996).”